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Abstract
This paper analyses the impact of the Basel 3 Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR)
on the unsecured interbank money market and therefore on the implementation of
monetary policy. Combining two unique datasets, we show that banks which are
just above/below their short-term regulatory liquidity requirement pay and charge
higher interest rates for unsecured interbank loans. The effect is larger for longer
maturities and increases after the failure of Lehman Brothers. During a crisis, be-
ing close to the minimum liquidity requirement induces banks to decrease lending
volumes. Given the high importance of a well-functioning interbank money mar-
ket, our results suggest that the current design of the LCR is likely to dampen the
effectiveness of monetary policy.
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1. Introduction
In December 2010 the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision (BCBS) drafted
a new regulatory framework1 (henceforth Basel 3) with the purpose to achieve a
more stable and less vulnerable banking system. Besides new rules for capital and
leverage, the framework also specifies a short- and a long-term liquidity require-
ment as key concepts to reinforce the resilience of banks to liquidity risks.
The Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) is a short-term ratio which requires financial
institutions to hold high quality liquid assets to meet short-term obligations which
are caused by sudden liquidity disruptions. Banks are required to hold an amount
of highly liquid assets at least equal to their net cash outflows over a 30-day stress
period. The Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) requires institutions to hold a mini-
mum amount of funding that is expected to be stable over a one year time horizon
based on liquidity risk factors assigned to assets and off-balance sheet liquidity ex-
posures greater than its required amount of stable funding. The NSFR is intended
to promote longer-term structural funding of banks’ balance sheets, off-balance
sheet exposures and capital markets activities.
The rationale and motivation behind the LCR are well known. Prior to the financial
crisis in 2008, asset markets were liquid and funding was easily available at low
cost. However, the emergence of the crisis showed how rapidly market conditions
can change, leading to a situation that several institutions - regardless of appropri-
ate capital levels - experienced severe liquidity issues, forcing either an intervention
by the responsible central bank or a shutdown of the institution. While the purpose
of the LCR is straightforward, both its exact setup and the induced side-effects are
still controversial. Summarizing, the discussion mainly focuses on the questions
whether the LCR leads to: a) an increase in the yield spreads between differently
classified assets with respect to liquidity and/or maturity, b) a general increase in
interest rates, c) a decline in banks’ lending, something akin to a credit crunch or
d) possible consequences for the interbank market. Bini Smaghi (2010) argues that
the introduction of the LCR will increase the yield spreads between assets classi-
fied as liquid and the ones classified as illiquid. A similar effect can be expected
1See BCBS (2010a) and BCBS (2010b).
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with regards to the maturity profiles. According to Bini Smaghi (2010), banks will
try to pass on their increased operating costs due to the holding of highly liquid but
low return assets to their clients: Tighter lending standards, higher lending rates
and active shedding of loans are the consequences. Went (2010) argues that meet-
ing the LCR will lead to reduced earning yields which in turn reduces those of the
individual bank but also of the aggregate banking sector.
Schmitz (2009), Schmitz (2010) as well as Bindseil and Lamoot (2011) argue that
the introduction of the LCR generally sets incentives for banks to decrease lending
and borrowing in the unsecured interbank money market due to their high run-off
assumption which would require banks to hold large liquidity buffers balancing
these outflows. Other observers argue that there would be no direct effect of the
LCR on loans with maturities shorter than 30 days which make the largest part of
the unsecured interbank money market. The reason for this is that any outflow (in-
flow) would be compensated by the respective inflow (outflow) within the LCR’s
30-day horizon. For loans with maturities longer than 30 days no repayments
would occur within the horizon of the LCR and therefore these loans would have
a direct effect. In any case, a shrinking of the unsecured interbank money market
would hamper the allocation and distribution of liquidity and therefore negatively
affect the liquidity risk exposure and liquidity risk absorption capacity of banks.
Further Bindseil and Lamoot (2011) argue that due to the reduction of liquidity
in the unsecured money market the role of EONIA in monetary policy implemen-
tation should be questioned. According to Schmitz (2011), the ECB, the Federal
Reserve as well as the Bank of England rely on the interbank money market interest
rate as operating targets in monetary policy implementation. This is confirmed by
Borio (2001) who shows that central banks implement monetary policy by manip-
ulating the interbank money market interest rates through open market operations
and therefore any price or volume movement in the interbank money market could
severely affect the effectiveness of monetary policy.
In 2003, De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) introduced a quantitative liquidity rule
8028 (henceforth DLCR).2 Under the DLCR, a bank’s actual liquidity must ex-
ceed required liquidity, at horizons of both one week and one month. Using the
2See DNB (2003).
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regulatory liquidity requirement DLCR as proxy for the LCR in combination with
confidential data on interbank borrowing and lending in the Dutch interbank mar-
ket, a set of controls accounting for the riskiness of an institution and its business
model, the purpose of this paper is to show whether the introduction of a quan-
titative liquidity rule leads to higher interest rates and lower lending volumes in
the unsecured interbank money market. This paper adds to the literature as it is
the only study, which provides empirical evidence on the impact of a quantitative
liquidity rule on the interbank money market and therefore on the implementation
of monetary policy.
The main results can be summarized as follows: A bank which is close to its min-
imum liquidity requirement asks and pays higher interest rates for loans in the
unsecured interbank money market. These results also hold when controlling for
an institution’s perceived riskiness, size and business model. Both effects increase
after the failure of Lehman Brothers and are larger for maturities longer than the
30-day horizon of the LCR. During stress, being just above/below the prudential
liquidity requirement induces a negative impact on lending volumes.
2. Literature Review
Starting with the collapse of Lehman Brothers on September 15th 2008, the
world has been subject to a global financial crisis, which affected all economies
around the globe. Since then, there has been a debate about causes, consequences
and possible countermeasures.3 Apart from its geographical dimension, the great
interest in this crisis also mitigated a discussion about the fundamental fragility and
vulnerability of the financial system as such.
Giavazzi and Giovannini (2011) argue for instance that the fragility of financial
markets mainly stems from their role for liquidity transformation. Liquidity trans-
formation links the financing of long-term funding for productive investments via
the pooling of agents with different transactional needs. However, once many
short-term depositors want to withdraw their money simultaneously, the value of
liquid investments is likely to fall short compared to short-term debt. A bank-run
3See for instance Reinhart and Rogoff (2008), Crotti (2009), Diamond and Rajan (2009) and
Hume and Sentance (2009).
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materializes with severe consequences for the stability of the financial market and
society as such. According to the seminal contribution of Diamond and Dybvig
(1983) banks are forced into fire sales due to the ability of depositors to withdraw
their funds, exposing banks to self-fulfilling panics. Once the funding for long-
term projects dries up, production will be less efficient resulting in lower income
for everybody
Illustrating the issue of liquidity transformation and the fragility of financial mar-
kets with several examples based on Holmstrom and Tirole (2011) as well as Di-
amond and Dybvig (1983), Giavazzi and Giovannini (2011) argue that the main
challenge of regulators is to minimize the likelihood of liquidity transformation to
break down. A widely used instrument to deal with these issues is the introduction
of a deposit insurance scheme, which makes retail deposits a safer form of funding.
However, as noted by Ayadi and de Groen (2012) more stable forms of funding can
only help a bank grow up to a certain point and thus banks will still heavily rely
on short-term (interbank) funding which also allows them to manage their balance
sheets pro-cyclically.4
Since the announcement of the BCBS to introduce new regulations for capital and
liquidity, several streams of academic and policy-oriented literature have been dis-
cussing possible long- and short-term impacts of the reform. MAG (2010a) and
MAG (2010b) assess the macroeconomic impact of tighter capital and liquidity re-
quirements during the transition phase. Modeling the direct effect of a liquidity
rule as a 25% increase in the holding of liquid assets combined with increased ma-
turities of banks’ wholesale liabilities, the authors find a 14 basis point increase in
the median lending spread and a fall in lending volumes of 3.2%. Analysing the
duration of the transition period, the studies find a negative relation between mag-
nitude of the effects and duration of the transition period. Both studies fail to take
into account that by definition new liquidity regulations (should) lead to stronger
and more stable banks which might lower their funding costs and therefore dampen
the increase in lending spreads and other negative side effects. Further, banks will
seek to improve their efficiency and therefore cutting non-interest expenses, which
in turn might lower the increase in lending spreads. On the other hand, the in-
4See for instance Adrian and Shin (2010).
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creased demand for liquid assets could possibly increase the price and therefore
the costs to meet the liquidity rules.
Recent microeconomic studies concerning banks’ liquidity management have fo-
cussed on several aspects such as the management of reserve requirements (Bar-
tolini et al. (2001), Jallath-Coria et al. (2002)), the transformation of short-term
liabilities into liquid assets (Berger and Bouwman (2009)) as well as securities
holdings and cash balances (Aspachs et al. (2005), Freedman and Click (2009)).
The way banks manage their overall liquidity under a quantitative liquidity require-
ment is shown in De Haan and Van den End (2012) as well as Schertler (2010).
Using quarterly data for three types (commercial, savings and cooperative) of Ger-
man universal banks from 2000-2008, Schertler (2010) analyses banks’ liquidity
management under the quantitative German measure. The idea behind the German
liquidity ratio (LR) is very similar to the Dutch 8028 as well as the LCR. Under
the LR banks are expected to hold sufficient regulatorily specified liquid assets to
cover all payment obligations which mature or are assumed to run off within a one
month period. Applying dynamic panel data regressions and looking specifically
at banks which are close (just below/ above) the LR, the author finds that close
banks (dependent on their type) have higher securities holdings or higher repay-
ments from loans in case they are subject to higher payment obligations. Further,
close banks seem to differ from non-close banks in a way that they tend to more
intensively reduce their long-term loans when they have higher contemporaneous
payment obligations.
However, there exists no study which analyses the direct impact of a quantitative
liquidity rule on the unsecured interbank money market. The purpose of this pa-
per is to provide empirical evidence on banks’ behaviour in the interbank market
depending on their (non)-fulfilment of their regulatory liquidity requirement.
3. Data description
In order to analyse the effects of a quantitative liquidity requirement on the
interbank market, we will bring together data on 1) DNB’s monthly prudential liq-
uidity reporting, 2) bilateral transactions in the interbank market for different ma-
turities (volumes and prices) and 3) risk indicators and other measures calculated
6
from the balance sheet. We will discuss these data sources in turn.
3.1. Dutch Liquidity Coverage Ratio (DLCR)
As proxy of the LCR, we examine banks’ liquidity holdings using monthly
data of the prudential Dutch quantitative liquidity rule DLCR. Under the DLCR, a
bank’s actual liquidity must exceed required liquidity, at horizons of both one week
and one month. For the purpose of this analysis, we calculate ratios of actual over
required liquidity. Actual liquidity is defined as the stock of liquid assets minus
haircuts plus recognised cash inflows weighted by degree of liquidity. Required
liquidity is defined as the assumed calls on contingent liquidity lines, assumed
withdrawals of deposits, assumed drying up of wholesale and derivative funding.
The current legislation of the DLCR allows banks to include Residential Mort-
gage Backed Securities (RMBS) as part of the liquidity buffer while the LCR does
(currently) not allow the inclusion of RMBS. Further, with respect to deposits and
contrary to the DLCR, the LCR distinguishes "stable" and "less stable" deposits
which have different run-off rates under stress and are classified according to a set
of predefined conditions. In order to limit the resilience on estimated inflows, the
BCBS capped inflows to a maximum of 75% of outflows while the DLCR takes
into account inflows to a full extent.5
The treatment of interbank loans is equal under the LCR and the DLCR. In case
of loans with maturities of less than 30 days, there is likely to be no direct effect
on either the LCR or the DLCR. If institution A receives a loan from institution B
with a maturity of less than 30 days, the increase of institution A’s liquidity buffer
is offset by an increase of its cash outflows within the LCR’s 30 day horizon. Simi-
larly, institution B’s declined liquidity buffer is compensated by a cash inflow from
institution A’s loan repayment.6 In case of loans with maturities longer than 30
days neither inflows nor outflows occur within the LCR’s 30 day horizon which
leads to a situation that the borrowing bank can increase its liquidity buffer and
therefore its LCR while institution B’s LCR will decline. Given that, our analysis
5For a more in depth description of the DLCR, please refer to De Haan and Van den End (2012).
6For completion it needs to be mentioned that in contrast to the DLCR, the LCR cannot increase
in case the institution is affected by the cap on inflows.
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focuses on loans with maturities longer than 30 days.7
Limited by the number of banks active in the interbank money market, we use
data for 61 Dutch banks from January 2004 to December 2011. To gain insight
in whether the introduction of a quantitative liquidity requirement affects the in-
terbank money market, we create a dummy which is 1 in case a bank’s DLCR is
between 90% (just below) and 110% (just above) and 0 otherwise. Over the whole
sample period, we have 2391 observations and 536 cases (22%) in which a bank’s
liquidity ratio is between 90% and 110%. The average time a bank remains close
to the requirement is 4.4 months, with a median of 2 months, a maximum of 54
and a minimum of 1 month.
3.2. Interbank Market
The interbank market works as an over-the-counter (OTC) market so prices
and volumes are not publicly known. Financial institutions settle various types of
payments in TARGET 2 (the interbank payment system of cross-border transfers
within the EU), such as payments on behalf of customers, bank-to-bank payments,
payment of the cash leg of a security trade, and pay-ins for the CLS system (contin-
uous linked settlement) to settle foreign exchange transactions. In 2010, the Dutch
part of TARGET 2 had 61 direct participants including a few large British banks,
a daily average of 34.000 transactions and a daily turnover of 295 billion euro.The
Dutch part of TARGET 2 constitutes roughly 13% (10%) of the complete TAR-
GET system in terms of volume (transactions).
In a recent paper, Heijmans et al. (2010) describe how, based on these flows, loans
can be identified and thus volumes and prices extracted. The authors build on the
seminal paper by Furfine (1999) and improve the algorithm to include durations of
up to one year.8 The algorithm has been applied in the US using Fedwire (Demiralp
et al. (2006), Ashcraft and Bleakley (2006), Hendry and Kamhi (2009)), Norway
(Akram and Christophersen (2010)), and Germany (Braeuning (2011)).
The algorithm returns information on the borrowing and lending institution, paid
7The results for shorter maturities follow a similar pattern, however with smaller coefficients. All
results for shorter maturities are available on request.
8For a more detailed description of the functioning of the algorithm, see Heijmans et al. (2010).
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interest rates, total value as well as duration of the loan. In order to match the fre-
quency of the liquidity data, we create monthly volume weighted averages of the
interest rates per bank to calculate spreads with the respective ecb interest rate and
monthly sums of the traded loans times maturity divided by total assets while in
both cases just taking into account loans with maturities longer than 30 days.
3.3. Balance Sheet
Alongside with the new requirements for liquidity, the BCBS tightened the capi-
tal rules and newly introduced a leverage ratio. To map the new Basel requirements
into the regression, we introduce a leverage ratio, which is defined as equity over
total assets and a capital ratio which reflects the ratio of capital over risk weighted
assets. For both of these measures we use (interpolated) monthly data per bank
from January 2004 to December 2011 from DNB’s prudential reporting.
Following a recent working paper by Hilscher and Wilson (2012) who show that
a set of easily obtainable balance sheet measures outperform professional credit
ratings and cds spreads, we include return on equity, profitability defined as the
percentage of income over total assets and cash flows reflected by the percentage
of cash over total assets to control for the riskiness of an institution. By definition
the variables referring to Basel III, leverage and capital, are measures of solvency
and therefore also reflect the riskiness of an institution. All variables are obtained
from DNB’s prudential reporting and cover January 2004 until December 2011.
The rationale behind including such a large amount of variables controlling for the
riskiness of an institution is that there is broad consensus that a bank’s activity in
the interbank market is at least partially driven by its perceived riskiness. There-
fore, controlling for the riskiness of an institution is essential when analysing the
interbank market. A further reason to include cashflows and profitability is that
these variables are correlated with the overall state of the economy which makes
them suitable candidates to control for the possibility that the dependent variables
and liquidity as the key independent variable are jointly driven by the current eco-
nomic situation.
3.4. The Interbank Market before and after the failure of Lehman Brothers
In a recent working paper Heijmans et al. (2010) analyse the Dutch interbank
market, based on four periods: 1) January 2004 until June 2007: financial markets
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were quiet and well-functioning, 2) July 2007 until August 2008: first turmoils, 3)
September 2008 until June 2009: failure of Lehman Brothers, followed by a severe
period of stress and 4) July 2009 until December 2011: Unconventional monetary
policy measures by the ECB. Looking at the developments in the interbank market
and following the general policy discussions, it is sensible to simplify the distinc-
tion in a period before and a period after the the failure of Lehman Brothers.
Comparing the average interest rates paid in the Dutch interbank market with EO-
NIA it becomes evident that before the failure of Lehman Brothers, the Dutch in-
terest rate is highly correlated with EONIA. However, after the collapse of Lehman
Brothers, the interest rates in the interbank market increase to a smaller extent than
the European average, suggesting that the effect of Lehman Brother’s failure is
somewhat smaller for Dutch banks compared to the European average. Still and
similar to the findings of Gorton (2009), the volatility and spreads of the inter-
est rates increase considerably after the failure due to higher risk aversion in the
market. Heijmans et al. (2010) find that the spreads of the Dutch interest rates in-
crease from 7.1 basis points before the failure to 18.6 basis points after the failure
of Lehman Brothers.
The average total turnover calculated as the sum of the total value of a loan times
its maturity for maturities longer than 30 days decreases from EUR 3.8 billion in
the period before the failure to EUR 2.64 billion in the period after the failure. The
first upward trends can be observed in the summer of 2009. In this period, the ECB
started injecting extra liquidity using unconventional monetary policy measures.
Summarizing, it can be seen that the credit crunch after the failure of Lehman
Brothers led to higher interest rates, higher volatilities and lower volumes. Al-
though the Dutch interbank market did not completely vanish and remained suf-
ficiently active, it needs to be mentioned that a drawback of our analysis is that
periodically the results might be heavily influenced by only a small number of
banks. However, those banks which remain active in a relatively inactive market
can be considered to be overproportionately strong and therefore (if anything) our
results underestimate the effects of the quantitative liquidity requirement.
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4. The Model
For the analyses with respect to interest rates, we apply panel regressions using
fixed effects. Apart from the results of the Hausman test, the choice for fixed in-
stead of random effects has three reasons: First, if the individual effect represents
omitted variables, it is highly likely that these bank-specific characteristics are cor-
related with the other regressors. Second, we want to analyse the adjustments of
banks’ behaviour in the time variation and not in the cross-sectional variation of the
data and third, our panel dataset includes very large to very small banks with large
variations with respect to business models which in turn implies that differences
among banks are not random. All employed models have the common feature that
they rely on the fulfilment of the prudential quantitative liquidity requirement. The
baseline equation takes the following form:
Yi,t = β0 +β1LOWi,t +β2Mi,t +β3Ci,t +β4Ri,t + εi,t (1)
with εi,t = µi +ηi,t
where Yi,t describes the dependent variable which is either the spread between the
volume weighted average of the monthly interest rate charged (paid) by an institu-
tion when lending (borrowing) in the unsecured interbank money market with the
respective ECB rate or the ratio of a bank’s monthly total lending over total assets.
The dummy variable LOWi,t allows us to gain insight whether a bank which is just
above/below the regulatory liquidity requirement behaves differently in the inter-
bank money market. The variable is 1 in case a bank’s liquidity ratio is between
90% and 110% and 0 otherwise. This approach is in line with other studies deal-
ing with the impacts of prudential regulation (Shrieves and Dahl (1992), Schertler
(2010)).9 Mi,t is a vector giving more insight into the exact composition of the
9The rationale behind using a dummy instead of a continuous variable is that we would like to
capture the direct effect of the fulfilment of the quantitative liquidity requirement instead of using a
proxy for the liquidity position of an institution. The disadvantage of our dummy is that we are not
able to distinguish between the behavioural changes of those banks which are still relatively close
to the threshold and the ones very far away. In order to account for this issue, we include in our
sensitivity checks the ratio of the DLCR as continuous variable.
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dependent variables. It includes LongLen reflecting the share of loans with ma-
turities longer than 30 days over total loans and an interaction term of LOW and
LongLen. This setup allows us to separate the general effects of a quantitative
liquidity rule from the effects on loans with maturities longer than 30 days. Ci,t
includes a dummy (crisis) which is 1 after the failure of Lehman Brothers and 0
otherwise alongside with an interaction term of LOW and crisis. Finally, Ri,t is
a vector of risk variables10, namely profitability, cash-flow and return-on-equity
as well as the Basel 3 measures leverage and regulatory capital following BCBS
(2010b). As we use fixed effects estimations, we also model a bank specific effect
µi and an iid disturbance term ηi,t .
5. Results
5.1. Lending Rates
Table 1 presents the estimation results for the spreads between the value weighted
average of interest rates charged by banks for interbank lending and the respec-
tive ECB interest rate and whether these rates differ between banks which are just
above/below the minimum liquidity requirement DLCR and banks for which this
condition does not hold.
Column 1 shows that banks, which are just above/below (LOW ) their regulatory
liquidity requirement DLCR, charge significantly (1% level) higher interest rates
when issuing a loan in the unsecured interbank money market. Interpreting the re-
sults, our analysis suggests that LOW banks charge 23 basis points more than their
peers for interbank loans. In Column 2, we add the variable LongLen reflecting the
share of loans with maturities longer than 30 days and total loans. The variable is
significant on the 1% level, suggesting that a 10% increase of the share of loans
with maturities longer than 30 days increases the lending rate by 1.2 basis points.
Given that the variance of LongLen is 0.1, its effect is small but economically sig-
nificant. The reason for this could either be that loans with longer maturities are
considered to be more risky or all banks are more hesitant to issue loans which will
10In order to keep the focus on the liquidity requirement, we present in the body of the paper only
the results when controlling for the profitability of an institution. In the Appendix several robustness
checks are presented in which we control for different combinations of risk indicators.
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Table 1: Effects of a quantitative liquidity rule on the Lending Rates in the interbank money market
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES FE FE FE FE FE FE
LOW 0.231*** 0.300*** 0.115** 0.110** 0.151** -0.0329
(0.0280) (0.0298) (0.0562) (0.0554) (0.0605) (0.0348)
LongLen 0.114*** 0.0567 0.0610 0.0609 0.0538
(0.0359) (0.0387) (0.0383) (0.0387) (0.0517)
LongLenLOW 0.340*** 0.325*** 0.293*** 0.172***
(0.0873) (0.0862) (0.0943) (0.0219)










Constant 0.795*** 0.716*** 0.743*** 0.740*** 0.771*** 1.039***
(0.0104) (0.0225) (0.0234) (0.0232) (0.0377) (0.0218)
Observations 2229 1730 1730 1718 1571 1571
r2_w 0.0303 0.0613 0.0695 0.0917 0.100 0.717
Note:Columns 1-6 present fixed effects panel estimations with the spread between the monthly volume weighted
average interest rate and the respective ECB interest rate being the dependent variable. The purpose of the above
regressions is to show whether banks which are just above/below (LOW) their quantitative liquidity requirement
charge higher interest rates for lending in the unsecured interbank money market. To show this, we additionally
control for the riskiness of an institution (pro f it defined as income over total assets) and the Basel III measures
Lev (equity over total assets) and Capital (BIS capital ratio). Further, we include LongLen (share of loans with
maturities longer than 30 days over total loans), LongLenLOW which is an interaction term of LOW and LongLen
as well as crisis (dummy which is 1 after the failure of Lehman and 0 otherwise) and LOWcrisis which is an
interaction term of LOW and crisis. Statistical significance is indicated by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 while
standard errors are in parentheses.
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not be repaid within the LCR’s 30 day horizon.
Column 3 shows the results when we additionally include LongLenLOW , the inter-
action term of LOW and LongLen. LongLenLOW enters the regression significantly
on the 1% level, suggesting that a bank which is just below/above its quantitative
liquidity requirement charges 3.4 basis points more in case the share of loans with
maturities longer than 30 days increases by 10%. Comparing this outcome to the
previous result in column 2 and given that LongLenLOW absorbs the significance
of LongLen, our results suggest that that the previous effect of LongLen was mainly
driven by LOW banks and that especially these banks charge more when issuing
loans with longer maturities. The results in column 2 and 3 are a first indication
that a quantitative liquidity rule indeed affects the interest rate in the unsecured in-
terbank market in general but especially for longer maturities. Although it remains
significant on the 5% level, LOW loses statistical and economic significance due
to the inclusion of LongLenLOW . This suggests that the effect of a liquidity regu-
lation on the interbank market is stronger for maturities longer than 30 days. This
result is straightforward given that we can assume that for maturities longer than
30 days both effects hold, the general direct effect of a quantitative liquidity rule
on the interbank market and a specific effect on loans with maturities longer than
30 days.
In Column 4, we add the variable pro f it to the estimation equation.11 Even when
controlling for the riskiness of an institution, the compliance with the prudential
liquidity requirement remains significant at the 5% level, however with a further
decreased economic significance. LongLenLOW remains stable on the 1% level
with only slightly decreased economic significance. The variable pro f it is statisti-
cally significant on the 1% level with positive sign, suggesting that an absolute in-
crease of a bank’s profitability by 1% increases the lending rate by 11 basis points.
Column 5 includes the other Basel 3 key concepts, Lev and Capital. Adding these
two measures leads to an increase of the coefficient of LOW while LongLenLOW
slightly decreases in terms of economic significance. Capital enters the regres-
11The variables used to control for the riskiness of an institution are of high importance for this
analysis. In order to remain focussed on the effects of a quantitative liquidity rule, we still decided
to present only the results which include profitability in the body of this paper while the analyses
including all risk controls can be found in the Appendix.
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sion significant on the 5% level with very small coefficient which suggests that an
increase of an institution’s capital ratio by 1% increases the lending rate by less
than 0.1 basis points. Both the economic insignificance and the positive sign of
Capital are rather surprising given that there seems to be broad consensus that sol-
vency plays an essential role in the interbank market. A potential explanation for
this effect could be that institutions with severe solvency issues cannot borrow in
the interbank market and do not have excess liquidity to lend to other banks. An
institution’s capital ratio therefore determines its access to the market but not its
interest rate.
Column 6 additionally includes crisis as well as the interaction term LOWcrisis
which entirely absorbs the significance of LOW . The quantitative liquidity regula-
tion however still significantly affects lending rates given that it is a component of
the two interaction terms LongLenLOW as well as LOWcrisis which are both sig-
nificant on the 1% level. Although its coefficient decreases to 0.17, LongLenLOW
remains economically significant. The coefficient of LOWcrisis suggests that dur-
ing a crisis, LOW banks charge 14 basis points more than their peers. The general
effect of LOW therefore seems to be the outcome of the combination of two fac-
tors: 1) LOW banks ask higher interest rates for loans with maturities longer than
30 days and 2) LOW banks increase the interest rates more drastically during crises.
While the negative sign of crisis seems to be counterintuitive at first, it needs to be
mentioned that we calculate spreads between the actual weighted interest rate and
the respective ECB interest rate. Therefore, crisis suggests that the spread between
the two rates is 80 basis points smaller during crises. The explanation for this is
that after the failure of Lehman Brothers only a few banks remained active in the
interbank money market. It can be assumed that the remaining institutions were
more stable and were therefore able to borrow and lend at rates closer to the ECB
interest rate. This explanation also holds on the international level given that Dutch
banks were considered to be relatively stable compared to their international peers.




Given the high correlation of the lending and borrowing rates of 0.8 and the
implied similarity of results, we do not discuss the borrowing rates in detail but
just point out the overall results and most important differences.
Generally speaking, LOW banks pay higher interest rates than their peers in the
unsecured interbank money market. The effect of being in a crisis has a similar ef-
fect for borrowing and lending rates while the effect of longer maturities is smaller
for the borrowing rates. In contrast to the lending rates, LOW banks do not pay
significantly higher interest rates for longer maturities. The effect of the variables
reflecting the riskiness of an institution have similar effects on borrowing and lend-
ing rates. Therefore, even when controlling for the riskiness of an institution, the
compliance with the prudential liquidity requirement remains a significant factor
when determining an institution’s borrowing rate in the unsecured interbank money
market.
This is an essential part of our analysis. The interest rate a bank has to pay in the
interbank market is the outcome of negotiations between the two counterparts. As
in any other contract, there is some sort of asymmetric information. Given the high
sensitivity, it is reasonable to assume that a bank’s regulatory liquidity position is
not known to the lending bank while it will be able to obtain some basic informa-
tion about the riskiness of its counterpart. In our model the riskiness is reflected by
profitability, leverage and capital. Hence, if we control for the riskiness of an insti-
tution which usually determines the borrowing rate in the interbank market, we can
conclude that the higher interest rates of LOW banks are caused by the willingness
of these banks to pay higher prices and not by the behaviour of the lending bank.
This conclusion is additionally confirmed by the nature of our fixed effects esti-
mation which estimates adjustments of banks’ behaviour in the time variation and
not in the cross-sectional variation. It is highly unlikely that the lending bank can
obtain information about its counterpart’s fulfilment of the liquidity requirement
over time but not of the before-mentioned balance sheet measures.
5.3. Total Lending
Table 2 presents the results for the analysis whether the introduction of a quan-
titative liquidity rule causes the ratio of total lending over total assets to decline.
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Table 2: Effects of a quantitative liquidity rule on banks’ lending volumes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES FE FE FE FE FE FE
LOW -3.402 8.072 6.478 2.480 -9.098 -10.06
(8.429) (9.115) (9.150) (14.07) (14.22) (14.24)
LOWcrisis -43.78*** -42.49*** -48.46*** -20.85* -20.09*
(13.41) (13.42) (11.28) (9.75) (9.77)
profit 15.02* 25.16*** 16.89** 17.92**
(8.121) (7.269) (7.452) (7.504)
LongLen -13.00 -9.169 -7.820
(9.314) (9.297) (9.370)






Constant 87.02*** 86.99*** 85.45*** 62.54*** 74.39*** 81.99***
(3.138) (3.131) (3.238) (5.714) (6.250) (9.082)
Observations 2182 2182 2182 1691 1691 1691
r2_w 0.0007 0.0503 0.0662 0.1206 0.1327 0.1332
Note:Columns 1-6 present fixed effects panel estimations with the percentage of total lending over total assets as
dependent variable (henceforth Lending). Total lending is calculated as the monthly sum of loan value multiplied
by maturity. The purpose of the above regressions is to show whether banks which are just above/below (LOW)
their quantitative liquidity requirement lend smaller volumes than their peers. To show this, we additionally control
for the riskiness of an institution (pro f it)) and the Basel III measures Lev (equity over total assets) and Capital
(BIS capital ratio). Further, we include LongLen (share of loans with maturities longer than 30 days over total
loans), LongLenLiqu which is an interaction term of LOW and LongLen as well as crisis (dummy which is 1 after
the failure of Lehman and 0 otherwise) and LOWcrisis which is an interaction term of LOW and crisis. Statistical
significance is indicated by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 while standard errors are in parentheses
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Column 1 shows that LOW does not have an individually significant effect on
Lending. Including however the interaction term LOWcrisis in column 2 shows
that the fulfilment of the quantitative liquidity requirement has a significant ef-
fect on Lending after the failure of Lehman Brothers. During stress, LOW banks’
Lending is 44% smaller than the lending of their peers. Given that the mean of
Lending is 108% with a median of 37%, the results are economically significant.
Adding pro f it in column 3 does not change the overall results considerably while
being itself significant on the 10% level. The coefficient of pro f it suggests that
an absolute increase of a bank’s profitability by 1%, increases Lending by 15%.
Given that the average bank in our sample increases its profitability by about 0.5%,
the effect is small but economically significant.
Similar to the regressions with respect to the interest rates, we add LongLen and
LongLenLOW in column 4. Both variables enter all regressions nonsignificant,
suggesting that while there is a combined effect of LOW on interest rates, for
Lending the interaction of LOW and crisis seems to be more dominant. Adding
crisis in the 4th regression confirms its high importance. In the specification of
column 4, crisis absorbs a considerable share of the significance of both LOWcrisis
and pro f it. The variable crisis itself is statistically significant on the 1% level with
a coefficient of -27.6, suggesting that during crises Lending declines by about 27%.
In column 6, we additionally add Lev, an institutions leverage ratio. Lev is statisti-
cally insignificant and does not alter the overall results considerably.
6. Sensitivity Tests
In this section we present the sensitivity tests which we conducted to show the
robustness of our results. In order to take into account the effects of the general
liquidity position of a bank but also the difference between a bank which is still
relatively close to the minimum liquidity requirement and a bank far away from
meeting the threshold, we include the actual ratio of the liquidity requirement as
continuous variable. Further, we split the dataset in large and small banks and fi-
nally re-run our model using a larger set of controls.
Adding a larger set of control variables changes the overall results with respect
to interest rates not considerably. Unexpectedly, it reduces somewhat the coeffi-
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cients and the significance of LOW , LongLenLOW and LOWcrisis. However, all
the variables related to the fulfilment of the DLCR remain economically and sta-
tistically significant. The continuous variable of the liquidity requirement (LRM)
does not have a dominant effect and is only statistically significant in one specifi-
cation with economically small coefficient. Dividing the dataset in small and large
banks yields relatively small changes while the effect of being just above/below the
DLCR is slightly larger for bigger banks.
With respect to lending volumes, the effect of additional control variables is some-
what bigger. While LOW as well as LongLenLOW remain statistically insignif-
icant, LOWcrisis loses some of its statistical but gaining some economic signifi-
cance. Interestingly, LRM is generally significant on the 1% level, having a positive
effect on Lending. A possible explanation for the large impact of the continuous
liquidity ratio on total lending while there is almost no effect on the interest rates
is the relatively small range of possible interest rates. It can be assumed that banks
with very high liquidity ratios can lower the lending rates just until a certain point.
The same situation applies for banks being very low on liquidity as these banks can
only increase their interest rates up to some limit. For total lending the situation
is different. Banks with a very high DLCR can lend as much as they want while
banks with a very low DLCR are able to entirely stop lending.
7. Conclusion
The aim of this study is to show the effects of a binding regulatory liquidity
requirement on the behaviour of banks in the unsecured interbank money market.
Our results suggest that a binding regulatory liquidity requirement gives rise to
banks paying and asking higher interest rates for unsecured interbank loans. These
effects are larger for maturities longer than the LCR’s 30 day horizon and increase
after the failure of Lehman Brothers. During a crisis, being just above/below the
prudential liquidity requirement induces a negative impact on lending volumes.
It is essential to note that there are important interactions between our results. Both,
interest rates and actual volumes jointly determine the behaviour of a bank in the
unsecured interbank money market. As established by our results, the general ef-
fect of a quantitative liquidity rule on interest rates is a combination of banks ask-
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ing (paying) higher prices for longer maturities and banks asking (paying) higher
prices during stress. For lending volumes, the main effect of the quantitative liq-
uidity rule is exerted during stress, given that banks for which the rule is binding
cut lending more drastically than their peers. Combining the results therefore leads
to the conclusion that the negative effect of a quantitative liquidity rule on the in-
terbank money market is particularly severe during stress.
As argued previously, the unsecured interbank money market is an essential instru-
ment for the distribution and allocation of liquidity. A shrinking of this market
alongside with skewed interest rates might therefore severely hamper the effec-
tiveness of monetary policy. Given the high importance of monetary policy during
stress in combination with our results suggesting that the negative effects of a quan-
titative liquidity rule are especially severe during recessions should set incentives
for regulators to clarify the usage of the LCR’s liquidity buffer alongside with es-
tablishing an extended buffer definition during stress.
Allowing banks to use their liquidity buffer during stress would dampen the nega-
tive effects of a quantitative liquidity requirement on the interbank money market.
The reason for this is that if banks can use their liquid assets to cover outflows
(as actually intended by the LCR), the liquidity requirement would be less bind-
ing with banks facing less incentives to increase interest rates and cut lending. A
similar effect can be expected when extending the definition of liquid assets during
stress. A potential extension would make it easier for banks to comply with their
liquidity requirement, again making the rule less binding and therefore reduce its
negative effects during stress on the interbank money market and more importantly
on the effectiveness of monetary policy.
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Table .3: Effects of a quantitative liquidity rule on the BORROWING rates in the interbank money
market
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES FE FE FE FE FE FE
LOW 0.206*** 0.243*** 0.294*** 0.316*** 0.340*** 0.0924
(0.0293) (0.0299) (0.0875) (0.0864) (0.100) (0.0670)
LongBor 0.400*** 0.411*** 0.410*** 0.411*** 0.283***
(0.0447) (0.0485) (0.0479) (0.0488) (0.0319)
LongBorLOW -0.0675 -0.114 -0.121 0.137*
(0.109) (0.108) (0.126) (0.0819)










Constant 0.858*** 0.567*** 0.557*** 0.552*** 0.614*** 0.984***
(0.0110) (0.0358) (0.0389) (0.0384) (0.0502) (0.0338)
Observations 2391 1978 1978 1960 1768 1768
r2_w 0.0206 0.0685 0.0686 0.0833 0.0923 0.616
Note:Columns 1-6 present fixed effects panel estimations. The regressions are the same as in 1. However, the
dependent variable in this case is the spread between the monthly volume weighted average BORROWING rate
and the respective ECB interest rate.
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Table .4: Lending rates and a larger set of controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES FE FE FE FE FE FE
LOW 0.238*** 0.114** 0.127** 0.115* 0.103* -0.0288
(0.0282) (0.0574) (0.0549) (0.0586) (0.0576) (0.0358)
LRM 0.0235 0.0183 -0.000896 0.0143 0.0115 -0.0201**
(0.0182) (0.0144) (0.0139) (0.0140) (0.0138) (0.00834)
LongLen 0.0556 0.0543 0.0866** 0.167*** 0.579
(0.0387) (0.0372) (0.0367) (0.0376) (0.0532)
LongLenLOW 0.339*** 0.273*** 0.236*** 0.290*** 0.184***
(0.0873) (0.0837) (0.0890) (0.0878) (0.0228)
profit 0.192*** 0.189*** 0.189*** 0.0435**
(0.0295) (0.0301) (0.0295) (0.0181)
RoE -0.257*** -0.273*** -0.273*** -0.124***
(0.0749) (0.0774) (0.0761) (0.0467)
cash -0.00667*** -0.0353*** -0.0337*** -0.00330*
(0.000685) (0.00264) (0.00260) (0.00168)
Lev -2.659 -3.197 2.673
(4.159) (4.086) (2.475)








Constant 0.749*** 0.708*** 0.788*** 0.846*** 0.670*** 1.049***
(0.0273) (0.0370) (0.0365) (0.0450) (0.0500) (0.0313)
Observations 2229 1730 1716 1571 1571 1571
r2_w 0.0318 0.0706 0.148 0.202 0.230 0.720
Note:This table presents the same regressions as Table 1 but with a larger set of controls. Namely, we additionally
included LRM (the DLCR as continuous variable), cash, RoE and NetLender.
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Table .5: Lending rates with a different sized banks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES large large large small small small
LOW 0.278*** 0.103* -0.0378 0.220*** 0.118** -0.0285
(0.0289) (0.0576) (0.0365) (0.0289) (0.0584) (0.0372)
LongLen 0.0620 0.0730 0.0549 0.0440
(0.0399) (0.0548) (0.0390) (0.0559)
LongLenLOW 0.407*** 0.171*** 0.319*** 0.171***











Constant 0.772*** 0.720*** 1.045*** 0.795*** 0.748*** 1.036***
(0.0111) (0.0237) (0.0239) (0.0102) (0.0234) (0.0225)
Observations 2010 1600 1460 2121 1624 1466
r2_w 0.0446 0.0858 0.724 0.0272 0.0649 0.711
Note:This table presents the same regressions as Table 1. However, in Columns 1 to 3 only large and in Columns
4 and 6 only small institutions are considered.
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Table .6: Lending Volumes and a larger set of controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES FE FE FE FE FE FE
LOW 4.734 14.12 -0.130 -12.76 -3.825 -5.734
(8.408) (9.110) (8.831) (9.326) (12.75) (12.74)
LRM 27.67*** 27.31*** 20.87*** 19.78*** 13.75*** 14.35***
(3.854) (3.845) (3.716) (3.712) (3.115) (3.115)
LOWcrisis -40.70*** 12.26 -35.85** -21.48* -23.35**
(13.27) (13.45) (14.60) (11.74) (11.74)
profit 14.08* 19.18** 13.58 31.96*** 34.64***
(8.030) (9.594) (9.657) (7.884) (7.922)
RoE -110.5** -124.9** -188.0*** -191.9***
(52.85) (52.78) (40.06) (39.99)
cash -2.915*** -2.795*** -2.999*** -3.020***
(0.210) (0.212) (0.161) (0.161)








Constant 32.73*** 31.94*** 64.82*** 78.03*** 65.42*** 81.32***
(8.174) (8.184) (8.209) (8.795) (8.624) (10.23)
Observations 2182 2182 2182 2182 1691 1691
r2_w 0.0236 0.0295 0.111 0.118 0.230 0.234
Note:This table presents the same regressions as Table 2 but with a larger set of controls. Namely, we additionally
included LRM (the DLCR as continuous variable), cash, RoE and NetLender.
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